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BEFORE THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
GLEN J. ELLIS,

PETITION FOR
WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Plaintiff/Appellant,
COURT OF APPEALS
CASE NO. 870252-CA

-vsUTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD,

SUPREME COURT
CASE NO.

Defendant/Respondent.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

Respondent Board replies to
Appellant's Petition for
Writ of Certiorari as follows:

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1-

Does the Appellant meet the eligibility requirements for a

Disability Retirement Benefit under either Utah Code Ann. § 49-10-28
or § 49-9a-8?
2-

To what extent may the Legislature modify and substitute

benefits in a retirement system and apply those modifications and substitutions to persons who have not met all the conditions precedent to
receiving a retirement benefit (those persons whose rights have not
"vested")?
-1-

OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
The opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals was filed July 6, 1988
under Case No. 870252 - CA.

See Appendix "A".

Appellant's petition

for rehearing with the Court of Appeals was denied in an order dated
August 16, 1988.

See Appendix "B".

SUPREME COURT JURISDICTION
A.

Date of Entry of the Opinion of the Court of Appeals July 6f 1988.

B.

Date of Entry of Order denying Appellant's Petition for
Rehearing - August 16, 1988.

C.

Respondent files no cross-petition.

D.

The Court's jurisdiction is based on Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(2)
and (5), 78-2a-4 and Rule 42 of the Rules of the Utah
Supreme Court.
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION
AND UTAH STATUTES

1-

Article 1, Section 18 of the Utah Constitution.
"No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law
impairing the obligation of contracts shall be
passed."

2-

Utah Code Ann. § 49-9a-4 - See Argument Point II

3-

Utah Code Ann. § 49-9a-8 - See Argument Point II

-2-

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Nature of the Case.
Prior to July 1, 1983, eligibility requirements for public
employee disability retirement benefits, as well as the benefits themselves, were governed under the provisions of the Utah State Retirement
Act.

(Retirement Act) Utah Code Ann. § 49-10-1 et seq.
On July 1, 1983, a new disability retirement program, "The Utah

Public Employees' Disability Act" (Disability Act) was implemented and
governed all covered disabilities which occurred on or after July 1,
1983.

Utah Code Ann. § 49-9a-l et seq.
On February 16, 1987, after hearing Appellant Ellis' request for

a disability retirement benefit, the retirement board, through its executive officer, notified Ellis that ne was not eligible for eitner:

(1)

benefits under the Retirement Act, since his date of disability was in
1986, three years after the new Disability Act became effective, or (2)
benefits under the new Disability Act, since Provo City, Appellant's
employer, had exercised its statutory option to decline coverage under
the new Disability Act.
Course of Proceedings and Disposition in Lower Courts.
Following the retirement board's denial of Appellant's
administrative appeal, he commenced legal action in the Fourth
District Court, later changed to Third District Court pursuant to
a motion made by Respondent.

Subsequently, the Third District Court

-3-

granted Respondent's Motion to Dismiss and denied Appellant's Motion
for Summary Judgment.
Appellant then appealed to the Utah State Court of Appeals,
which affirmed the lower court decision.

Appellant subsequently

filed a Petition for Rehearing with the Court of Appeals, which
was denied August 16, 1988.

This Petition for Writ of Certiorari

has resulted from that denial.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1-

Appellant Ellis was head of the Provo City Attorney's Office.

On April 28, 1986, Ellis applied for disability retirement.
existing statutory provisions he was not totally disabled.

Under
(Opinion

of Court of Appeals, Appendix "A" Page 1, paragraph 2 ) .
2-

The Utah State Retirement Board, through its executive

director, notified Ellis on February 16, 1987, that his disability
application had been denied on the grounds the Legislature had
replaced the disability plan under which Ellis sought benefits, see
Utah Code Ann. § 49-10-1 et seq. (1981), with a new plan which was
optional for political subdivisions such as Provo City.
Ann. § 49-9a-l et seq. (1984).

See Utah Code

Provo City elected not to participate

and, in any event, Ellis would have been ineligible for a disability
benefit under the Disability Act because he was not totally disabled.
(Opinion of Court of Appeals Exhibit "A" Page 1, paragraph 3 ) . He
would not have been eligible under the Retirement Act because he
-4-

continued to work for Provo City while seeking disability benefits.
See also Appendix "C".
3-

Appellant Ellis appealed the retirement board decision to

the Third District Court.

The Respondent Board moved to dismiss on

the basis of Appellant's failure to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted.

Appellant moved for Summary Judgment.

The Court

granted Respondent Board's Motion to Dismiss and denied Ellis' Motion
for Summary Judgment.

(Opinion of Court of Appeals, Page 2, paragraph

2).
4-

Appellant then appealed to the Utah Court of Appeals, which

affirmed the District Court judgment.

(Opinion of Court of Appeals,

July 6, 1988).
5Appeals.

Appellant filed a Petition for Rehearing with the Court of
The Petition for Rehearing was denied August 16, 1988,

Appendix "B".
6-

Appellant now petitions The Supreme Court of Utah for Writ

of Certiorari.
ARGUMENTS
POINT I.

APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI CONTAINS
NO SPECIAL OR IMPORTANT REASON THEREFOR, AS REQUIRED
BY RULE 43 OF THE RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT.

Rule 43 of the Rules of the Supreme Court clearly states that
review by writ of certiorari will only be granted when there are
special and important reasons for doing so.

-5-

Rule 43 then indicates

the "character of reasons11 that will be considered by the Court.

Four

characters of reasons are specified, but none of these four are cited
or appear to have been argued by the Appellant and none of them are
applicable in this case.

POINT II. SINCE APPELLANT'S DISABILITY OCCURRED IN 1986,
THE PROVISIONS OF THE UTAH PUBLIC EMPLOYEES
DISABILITY ACT, WHICH APPLIES TO ALL DISABILITIES
OCCURRING ON OR AFTER JULY 1, 1983, GOVERN APPELLANT'S
DISABILITY BENEFITS. APPELLANT IS INELIGIBLE FOR A
BENEFIT UNDER THAT ACT.
The provisions of the 1983 Disability Act, which governed the
disposition of this case in the courts below, provide:
§ 49-9a-4. All employers participating in the Utah State
Retirement System may cover their employees under this act.
Nothing in this act shall require any political subdivision
or educational institution to be covered by this act.
§ 49-9a-8. All covered disabilities with a date of disability
on or after the effective date of this act shall be administered
under the provisions of Chapter 10, Title 49. In no event, may
a disability be covered under both Chapter 10, Title 49 and this
act. (The effective date of the act was July 1, 1983. Laws of
Utah 1983, Ch. 223, § 2 ) .
Appellant claimed disability in 1986.

His employer, Provo City,

had exercised its statutory option to not participate in the disability
plan offered by the 1983 Disability Act.

Yet, despite these facts,

Appellant asserts, and would have this Court hold, that since the
Legislature did not expressly repeal the disability benefits offered
by the Retirement Act under Utah Code Ann. § 49-10-28 (1981) when it
enacted the 1983 Disability Act, that he should be allowed to retire
under the Retirement Act, even though it is only for those whose
disabilities commenced prior to July 1, 1983.

-6-

Tfrfc Court of Appeals understood the ramifications of this disturbing argument and offered a clear analysis of the interrelationship of
the two disability plans:
"Thus, in 1983 the Legislature, by clear express
language provided that two disability retirement
systems would co-exist in Utah. The earlier 1967
Retirement Act would continue to cover disabilities commencing before the effective date of the
1983 Disability Act. However, all those whose
disabilities commenced after the 1983 Disability
Act became effective would be governed by the
later Disability Act." (See Opinion, Exhibit
"A" Page 3, paragraph 3.)
Thus, the Disability Act governs Appellant's disability retirement
benefits, and under that Act, Appellant is ineligible for benefits.
First, Provo City elected to not participate in the plan, as allowed
by Utah Code Ann. § 49-9a-4.

Second, even if Provo City had partici-

pated in the plan, Appellant would still be ineligible because ne was
not "totally disabled" as required by the Act, a fact conceded by
Appellant in the courts below.

(See Opinion, page 1.)

While not determinative of the outcome of this petition, Respondent
Board offers some observations on certain allegations made by the
Appellant in his petition.

In his first argument, he argues that the

repeal of § 49-10-28 has resulted in a windfall to the board "which no
longer has to pay out anything for disability retirement."
mentative statement is clearly specious.

This argu-

All disability retirees who

properly met the requirements of § 49-10-28; i.e., they were disabled
prior to January 1, 1983, continue to receive disability retirement
payments from the board from the contributions made to that plan.
-7-

POINT III.

APPELLANT HAS NOT SATISFIED ALL THE CONDITIONS
PRECEDENT TO RECEIVING A DISABILITY RETIREMENT
BENEFIT. HIS RIGHTS TO THE BENEFIT ARE THEREFORE
NOT VESTED AND MAY BE REASONABLY AMENDED BY
LEGISLATIVE ACTION.

Appellant argues that he has a contractual vested right to a disability benefit under the pre-1983 law pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §
49-10-28.

But since he was, by his own admission, not disabled in 1983,

he is in essence arguing that the Legislature had no right to enact
legislation taking away his right to a disability retirement benefit
under the Retirement Act.
There is no question that if Appellant had met all the conditions
for obtaining a disability retirement benefit under the Retirement Act,
his retirement would have contractually "vested11, and this case would
have been resolved under Utah Code Ann. § 49-9a-8 at the administrative
level.

But Appellant never did meet all the conditions for obtaining

the disability benefit under the Retirement Act, i.e., his disability
did not commence prior to July 1, 1983, and the date of the commencement
of disability is a condition for determining a benefit.
The Court of Appeals in this case offers an interesting analysis
of the two conflicting lines of authority governing the rights of
employees under retirement systems.

Utah numbers itself among those

states which adhere to the contractual line of authority.

Beginning

with Driggs v. Utah Teachers Retirement Board, 105 Utah 417, 142 P.2d
657 (1943), the Utah Supreme Court has consistently held that when an

-8-

employee has satisfied all conditions precedent to receiving his benefits, then the employee has a "vested right" in his benefits as provided
by law at the time of retirement and subsequent legislative enactments
cannot reduce or diminish that benefit.

See Hansen v. Public Employees

Retirement System Board of Administration, 122 Utah 44, 246 P.2d 591,
597 (1952); Newcomb v. Ogden City Public School Teachers 1 Retirement
Commission, 121 Utah 503, 243 P.2d 941, 947 (1952).
Most recently, this Court had the opportunity to uphold these
principles in Johnson v. Utah State Retirement Board, (No. 20734, filed
September 19, 1988) wherein the Court concluded an analysis of the
Legislature's right to modify pension statutes of retired members of
the Public Safety Retirement System, Utah Code Ann. § 49-11-1 et seq.
(Supp. 1985), with the following statement:
"The State may not rescind or modify its
offer after it has been accepted and all
conditions have been satisfied. ld^ at 8.
Utah law is thus settled on this issue.

Since Appellant did not

satisfy all the conditions precedent for a disability benefit under the
Retirement Act, his rights are not vested.

The Legislature is thus

permitted to modify, or as is the case here, provide a substantial
substitute for, the disability benefits under the Retirement Act, and
apply its provisions to Appellant and all others similarly situated.

-9-

SUMMARY
There are no new questions of law to be decided in this case.

The

Court of Appeals has issued an opinion which is consistent with well
established precedent in this jurisdiction.
Appellant has no right to a disability benefit under either Utah
Code Ann. § 49-10-28, or § 49-9a-8, since his rights are not vested
in the Retirement Act and he does not meet the eligibility requirements of the Disability Act.
Appellant has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.
Respectfully submitted.

M aJ^^)r\

MarH A. Madsen, Attorney for
Defqndant/Respondenjb Utah
Sta e Retirement Board
^

MAILING CERTIFICATE

JM^

I hereby certify that 1 mailed .a"true and correct copy of the
foregoing Respondent's Brief to Glen J. Ellis, Attorney for Plaintiff/
Appellant, 60 East 100 South, Suite 102, P. 0. Box 1097, Provo, Utah
84603 and delivered 10 copies to the Clerk of the Utah Supreme Court
on this

" 7 ^

day of October, 1988.
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ooOoo

JUL "8 1988
UTAH STATE LAW UWARY

Glen J. Ellis,
Plaintiff and Appellant/

OPINION
(For Publication)

v*
Utah State Retirement Board,

Case No. 870252-CA

Defendant and Respondent.
Before Judges Billings, Greenwood, and Davidson.

BILLINGS, Judge:

LED
Timothy \\. Shoa
Cj/rk of the Court
ah Coun of Appeals

Plaintiff Ellis appeals from the district court's
decision affirming an administrative denial of his application
for disability retirement benefits. Ellis' main contention is
that the lower court erred in upholding the administrative
ruling that the 1983 Utah Disability Act rather than the 1967
Utah State Retirement Act governed his claim for disability
benefits. We affirm the district court's judgment.
Ellis was the head of the Provo City Attorney's Office
for over 20 years. According to Ellis' attending physician,
Ellis suffered numerous medical conditions stemming from the
stressful nature of his employment. Consequently, on April 28,
1986, Ellis applied for disability retirement benefits. He was
not totally disabled but, rather, sought less stressful legal
employment.
The Utah State Retirement Board denied Ellis' application
for disability retirement benefits finding the Legislature
replaced the disability plan under which Ellis sought benefits,
see Utah Code Ann. §§ 49-10-1 to -61 (1981), with an optional
plan in 1983, s^e Utah Code Ann. §§ 49-9a-l to -15 (1984), in
which Provo elected not to participate and under which, in any
event, Ellis would not have qualified because he was not
totally disabled.
Ellis objected to the administrative denial of benefits
and sought a formal hearing before the Board. In a hearing

held in February 1987, the Board listened to Ellis and then
requested Ellis to leave the room so the Board could consider
his application. The Board denied Ellis' application for
benefits. -In response, Ellis filed a complaint in district
court seeking a review of the Board's decision. He claimed
that if the Board was correct in finding the Legislature
repealed the retirement plan under which he sought benefits,
then this repeal was unconstitutional. Ellis also challenged
the procedure of the Retirement Board claiming the Board failed
to comply with the Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act and the
Open and Public Meetings Act.
The Board moved to dismiss Ellis' complaint asserting it
failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
Ellis moved for summary judgment arguing that, as a matter of
law, the 1983 enactment of the long-term disability act did not
repeal the retirement plan under which he sought benefits. The
court granted the Board's motion to dismiss and denied Ellis'
motion for summary judgment. This appeal ensued.
I.
At the outset, we must determine whether the Legislature
replaced the 1967 retirement program under which Ellis sought
and qualified for disability benefits. Since this issue raises
a question of special law, see Utah Dep't of Admin. Servs. v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 658 P.2d 601, 610 (Utah 1983), we must
determine whether the Board's decision falls within the limits
of reasonableness or rationality. Id.
Our analysis of whether the Legislature replaced the
earlier retirement program is best understood against the
background of the relevant statutory history. Between July 1,
1967, and June 30, 1983, state retirement benefits were
governed by the Utah State Retirement Act. Utah Code Ann.
§§ 49-10-1 to -61 (1981). Section 49-10-28 of the Retirement
Act provided that a state employee was entitled to disability
benefits provided the employee had worked at least 10 years for
the state and a medical examination determined that the
employee was "physically or mentally incapable of performance
of the usual duties of his employment and should be retired and
the administrator so recommends to the board."
On March 10, 1983, the Legislature enacted the Utah
Public Employees' Disability Act. 1983 Utah Laws ch. 223, § 1
(codified at Utah Code Ann. §§ 49-9a-l to -15 (1984)). The
Legislature did not expressly repeal the Utah State Retirement
Act when it enacted the Disability Act; however, the
Legislature clearly provided that the Disability Act would
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cover all disabilities with a date of disability on or after
the effective date of the Act, namely July 1, 1983. 1983 Utah
Laws ch. 223,. § 2; Utah Code Ann. § 49-9a-8 (1984). Provisions
of the Disability Act relevant to the instant case, with our
emphasis added, provide:
section 49-9a-4: All employers
participating in the Utah state retirement
system may cover their employees under this
act. Nothing in this act shall require any
political subdivision or educational
institution to be covered by this act.
section 49-9a-8: All covered disabilities
with a date of disability on or after the

effective d9te of this get shgii be
administered under this act. Disabilities
commencing before the effective date of this
act shall be administered under the
provisions of Chapter 10, Title 49. In no
event, may a disability be covered under
both Chapter 10, Title 49 and this act.
Thus, in 1983 the Legislature, by clear, express language
provided that two disability retirement systems would co-exist
in Utah. The earlier 1967 Retirement Act would continue to
cover disabilities commencing before the effective date of the
1983 Disability Act. However, all those whose disabilities
commenced after the 1983 Disability Act became effective would
be governed by the later Disability Act.
In order to receive disability benefits under the
Disability Act, the employee must be totally disabled.
"Totally disabled" is defined by the Disability Act to mean
"complete inability to engage in any gainful occupation which
is reasonable, considering the employee's education, training
and experience." Utah Code Ann. § 49-9a-3(10) (1984). 1 The
effective date of the Disability Act was July 1, 1983. 1983
Utah Laws ch, 223, § 2. After July 1, 1983, the Retirement
Board refused to accept contributions for the Chapter 10, Title
49 fund.
1. Ellis concedes he is not "totally disabled" as defined by
the Disability Act and, therefore, does not qualify for
disability benefits under this statutory scheme.

870028-CA
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On appeal, Ellis contends the Legislature did not
impliedly repeal the Utah State Retirement Act when it
subsequently^, enacted the Disability Act. We agree that the
Legislature did not impliedly repeal the Retirement Act but,
rather, by clear language, it expressly replaced the Retirement
Act with the Disability Act for disability retirements
commencing after the Disability Act's effective date*
We acknowledge the authority governing implied repeals of
legislation. As a general proposition, implied repeals are not
favored and are found only if there is a manifest inconsistency
or conflict between the earlier and later statutes. State v.
Sorensen, 617 P.2d 333, 336 (Utah 1980). Subsequently enacted
statutes relating to the same subject matter as previous
statutes are, if possible, to be construed so as to make the
later enactments harmonious with the former provisions. Stahl
v. Utah Transit Authority, 618 P.2d 480, 481 (Utah 1980).
Nonetheless,
[W]here a consistent body of laws cannot be
maintained without the abrogation of a
previous law, a repeal by implication of
previous legislation . . . is readily found
in the terms of the later enactment. It is
the necessary effect of the later enactment
construed in the light of the existing law
that ultimately determines an implied
repeal. . . . [W]here a conflict is readily
seen by an application of the later
enactment in accord with [the legislative]
intent, it is clear that the later enactment
is intended to supersede the existing law.
1A C. Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 23.09, at 332
(4th ed. 1985). This is so because when there is an
irreconcilable conflict between the new provision and the prior
statutes relating to the same subject matter, the new provision
is deemed controlling as it is the later expression of the
Legislature. Murray City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314, 1318 (Utah
1983).
The foregoing authority, however, is inapplicable as we
are persuaded the Legislature clearly and expressly provided
that the Utah State Retirement Act would continue to govern
disabilities arising before July 1, 1983, the effective date of
the Disability Act, but all those disability retirements
occurring thereafter would be governed by the Disability Act.
Therefore, there is no irreconcilable conflict between the
Retirement Act and the Disability Act as the two acts are

870028-CA
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mutually exclusive, A disability is governed by one statutory
act or the other/ but not both. A consistent body of law :i 5
maintained and the Disability Act does not abrogate the
Retirement Act,
The date of EI lis' di^aBiiity it> AIM 11 z6r I J O U , 1 1
after July 1, 1983, which is the effective date of the
Disability Act. Consequently, the Disability Act govern
Ellis* disability retirement benefits
Huwever, as previuti. ly
mentioned,, supra Note 1, Ellis is not
illy disabled" as
required by the Disability Act. Thei
1 i"# Ellis is not
entitled to disability benefi ts und*-*«
qoverri i nq s t at n ' u "
scheme.

Notwithstanding our holding that Ellis does not qualify
for benefits under either retirement scheme/ we must ' determine whether the Legislature's replacement of t.\
Retirement Act with the Disability Act unconstitutionally
deprived Ellis of vested contractual rights. Ellis con*- r
that if the Disability Act governs his eligibility for
disability retirement benefits, then he was unconstitutionally
denied his vested contractual rights to an earned disability
pension. Under Utah law, Ellis' argument is without mer ! ^,
There are
retired employee
•e line o:. a*;*
retirement plan is
gratuity in w
vested rights and/
employer's option
111. 430, 107 N.E.2d ,„.
compulsory participation .ui-.c.
recipients because statutes arte
the sovereign power of the scate
contracts between the participant
State Bd. of Retirement, 331 M,.s(holding that an employee had
were infringed by the repeal o.
employee's eligibility for retir
v. Trammel1, 129 Tex. 150,
1 S.
employee has no vested ri<
^

*^ holds that a
recipient has no
xj terminable at the
Board of Trustees, 412
plans which ma nda t e
^hts upon
nef its A t -> * upon
u^L in the nature of
3 state); Roach v.
.- N.E.2d 850 (1954)
rights to pension which
en statute despite
LJ repeal); Dallas
(1937) (put lie
~y pension^

The other line of authority adheres to the contractual
view which reasons that once a public employee has fulfilled
all the conditions precedent to receiving retirement benefits,
the employee has certain vested rights which cannot 1e Impaired
by subsequent administrative or legislative enactments. See,
e.g., Yeazell v. Copins, 98 Ariz, 109, 402 P,2d 541 (1965)
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(right to public pension vests upon acceptance of public
employment and laws of state are part of every contract); Betts
v. Board of Admin, of the Pub. Employees' Retirement Svs., 21
Cal.3d 859, 148 Cal. Rptr. 158, 582 P.2d 614 (1978) (public
employee's pension constitutes an element of compensation, and
a vested contractual right: to pension accrues upon acceptance
of employment); In re State Employees' Pension Plan, 364 A.2d
1228 (Del, 1976) (vested contractual rights exist under statP
pension law for those public employees who have fulfilled
eligibility requirements); Miles v. Tennessee Consolidated
Retirement Sys. , 548 S.W.2d 299 (Tenn. 1977) (public employ—
has contractual right to pension benefits), Under the
contractual view, state legislatures may reasonably alter the
terms or modify the retirement system to improve it or ke<^
on a sound basis prior to retirement for purposes of
maintaining the integrity of the system. See, e.g., Bettb
P.2d at 617. Once the retirement benefits have vested,
however, the Legislature can modify the plan only upon a
showing that a vital state interest will be protected, Miles,
548 S.W.2d at 305, and only where a substantial substitute is
provided for in lieu of the loss of benefits sustained.
Newcombe v. Qgden City Public School Teacher's Retirement
Comm'n, 121 Utah 503, 243 P.2d 941, 948 (1952),
Utah adheres to the contractual line of authority. In
Driqqs v. Utah State Teachers Retirement Bd., , 105 Utah 417 1 -J ,„•"
P.2d 657 (1943), the Utah Supreme Court recognized that an
employee who receives a mere gratuitous allowance awarded for
appreciation of past services has no vested rights in the
allowance and it is terminable at w i] ]
ici at 659.. On the
other hand, when a retired employee had made the requisite
contributions and had satisfied all conditions precedent to h:i s
benefits, then the employee had a "vested right" in his
retirement benefits as provided by the statute at the time of
his retirement and a subsequent amendment could not reduce the
amount of benefits to which the employee was entitled... L^. at
663-64.
Since Driqqs, our supreme court, has consistently held
tl lat the employee has this vested contractual right only when
he has satisfied all conditions precedent to receiving the
benefit,, i e., he has attained retirement age*
nas been
medically disabled. See Hansen v. Public Employees Retirement
Svs. Bd. of Admin., ,,2 Utah 44, 246 P.2d 591, 597 (1952);
Newcombe v. Qgden City Public School Teachers' Retirement

870028 -CA

6

Comm'n, ] 23 Utah 503, 243 P 2d 941

94 7 (19 52) 2

Based "Upon the foregoing authority,, we are persuaded
Ellis was not deprived of vested contractual benefits because
he failed to satisfy the conditions precedent to his disability
retirement benefits, namely Ellis had not become disabled and
retired before the Legislature enacted the Disability Act.
Consequently, he was not enti tli ed to benefi ts under the
governing Disability A c t .
I.
Ellis further contends * . Retirement Board violated the
A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Rulemaking A c t J by failing to comply with rule
making procedures w h e n it determined the Retirement Act had
been replaced by the Disability Act in deciding Ellis*
eligibility for disability b e n e f i t s . Ellis contends that such
a determination w a s , in effect, a policy determination subject
to adequate advance notice t~ ? - -if — cted parties.
2, W e n o t e , howev*;..-; that Driggs was slightly modified ir.
N e w c o m b e . In N e w c o m b e , the court held a statute w h i c h dist
a statutory pension system invalid as to retired employees
Newcombe, 243 P.2d at 9 4 8 . In dictum, however, the court
acknowledged that had the Legislature "attempted to make c h a n t s
in local retirement systems for the purpose of strengthening
them, there would be no difficulty in finding authority to
support such action." i d . at 9 4 6 . To support this dictum, the
court relied on several cases holding that vested rights of
retired employees are not impaired by a reduction in the amount
of the pension payments pursuant to statutes enacted subsequent
to retirement, provided the purpose of such statutes is to
render the retirement pension system actuarially sound
3. T h e A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Rulemaking Act, Utal i Code A n n .
§§ 63-46a«l to -15 ( 1 9 8 6 ) , w a s significantly revised and amended
in 1 9 8 7 , after the commencement of this action. A c c o r d i n g l y ,
our analysis focuses on the administrative provisions in effect
at the time of E l l i s ' hearing before the Retirement Board.
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opportunity to participate, and an opportunity to comment.4
Any agency subject to the Administrative Rulemaking Act
promulgating a rule must follow the procedures specified. See
Williams v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 720 P.2d 773, 775 (Utah 1986)
(interpreting the Utah Rule Making Act, the predecessor to the
Administrative Rulemaking Act). The Administrative Rulemaking
Act requires rule making whenever "agency actions affect a
class of persons" and defines a rule as Ma statement made by an
agency that applies to a general class of persons, rather than
specific persons . . . [which] implements or interprets policy
made by statute . . . ." Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46a-(3)(a),
-2(8) (1986). 5
The critical question, therefore, is whether the
Retirement Board's decision to deny Ellis disability retirement
benefits based upon its interpretation of the language of the
Disability Act amounted to a rule within the meaning of the
Administrative Rulemaking Act. "We acknowledge that there is a
variance of opinion on when an agency is engaged in rule making
and must follow formal rule making procedures, and when an
agency may legitimately proceed by way of adjudication."
Williams, 720 P.2d at 776. See generally 2 K. Davis,
Administrative Law Treatise § 7.2 (2d ed. 1979). "Many rules
are the product of rulemaking, and rulemaking is the part of
the administrative process that resembles a legislature's
enactment of a statute. An order is the product of
adjudication, and adjudication is the part of the
4. The Retirement Board contends that Ellis did not raise the
applicability of the Administrative Rulemaking Act below and,
therefore, is precluded from raising this issue for the first time
on appeal. We disagree. The record indicates that Ellis raised
this issue not only in his amended complaint but also in his
motion for summary judgment.
5. The Retirement Board argues that it is exempt from the
Administrative Rulemaking Act because it is a "political
subdivision." Since the commencement of this action, the Utah
State Retirement Act was amended and the Legislature decreed that
the Board "shall voluntarily comply" with the provisions of the
Administrative Rulemaking Act. Utah Code Ann. § 49-1-201(4)
(1987). This new language implies that during the period of time
at issue here the Board may indeed have been exempt from the Act's
coverage. But see Utah Attorney General Informal Opinion 86-16
(June 4, 1986), wherein Utah's Attorney General concludes that the
Retirement Board was required to comply with the requirements of
the Administrative Rulemaking Act. Inasmuch as we conclude that
the Board, in any event, complied with the Act, we need not decide
whether it was required to do so.
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8

administrative process that resembles a court's decision of a
case." 2 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 7.2, at 4 (2d
ed. 1979).
In Williams v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 720 P.2d 773 (Utah
1986), the Utah Supreme Court interpreted the definition of
"rule" contained in the Utah Rule Making Act, the predecessor to
the Administrative Rulemaking Act. 6 In Williams, the
petitioners charged the Public Service Commission with failure
to follow proper administrative procedures in concluding that it
did not have jurisdiction to regulate one-way mobile telephone
paging services. The supreme court held that the Commission's
letter stating that no certificate of public convenience and
necessity was required constituted a "rule" and, consequently,
the Commission, when reaching this determination, should have
followed the rule making procedures. !£. at 776. The court
relied on three factors in reaching this conclusion. First, the
Commission's decision was generally applicable. Second, the
letter interpreted the scope of the Commission's statutory
regulatory powers, thus interpreting the law within the meaning
of the Act. Finally, in so acting, the Commission made a
"change in clear law" by reversing its long-settled position
regarding the scope of its jurisdiction and announcing a
fundamental policy change. I£.
Based upon the foregoing, we conclude the Retirement Board
was not engaged in rule making and, therefore, did not have to
adhere to rule making procedural requirements. Rather, the
Board was merely applying the explicit statutory language of the
Disability Act to the facts of Ellis' case. The explicit
language of the Disability Act provides that that Act, not the
Retirement Act, governs all disabilities with a date of
disability after July 1, 1983. Ellis' date of disability is
April 26, 1986. This administrative process does not resemble
the Legislature's enactment of a statute. On the contrary, the
administrative process examined here resembles a court's
decision applying explicit statutory language. The only policy
decision which was generally applicable was made by the
Legislature in its enactment of the Disability Act. The change
in clear law in this instance was promulgated by the
Legislature, not the Retirement Board. Therefore, the
Retirement Board was not compelled to follow the rule making
procedures of the Administrative Rulemaking Act.
6. The court stated that its conclusion would not be any
different had the court been called upon to interpret the
definition of "rule" within the meaning of the subsequently
enacted Administrative Rulemaking Act. Williams, 720 P.2d at
775 n.7.
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IV.
The final issue we address is whether the Retirement Board
violated the^Open and Public Meetings Act, Utah Code Ann.
§§ 52-4-1 to -9 (1981), when it requested Ellis to leave the
room while it deliberated his appeal from the administrative
denial of benefits.
The Open and Public Meetings Act requires that every
"meeting" of a Mpublic body" be open to the public. As used in
this Act, "public body" means "any administrative, advisory,
executive or legislative body of the state or its political
subdivisions which consists of two or more persons that expends,
disburses or is supported in whole or in part by tax revenue and
which is vested with the authority to make decisions regarding
the public's business." Utah Code Ann. § 52-4-2(2) (1981).
We are persuaded that the Open and Public Meetings Act is
not applicable to the Retirement Board. First, the Utah State
Retirement Fund is administered as a common trust fund and not
supported by tax revenue. Second, the Retirement Board is not
vested with authority to make decisions regarding the public's
business. The Board administers funds for the benefit of the
beneficiaries and not for the public at large. Hansen v. Utah
State Retirement Bd., 652 P.2d 1332, 1338 (Utah 1982). When
Hansen was decided, "[s]ome 80 percent of the beneficiaries
[were] not state employees, but employees of municipalities or
counties." I£.
"No state funds [were] appropriated to meet any
administrative costs." id. Ellis' argument that the Board
acted contrary to the Open and Public Meetings Act is without
merit.
Affirmed.
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UTAH STATE COURT OF APPEALS

Glen J. Ellis,
Plaintiff, and Appellant,

ORDER
No. 870252-CA

v.
Utah- State Retirement Board,
Defendant and Respondent,

This matter is before the Court upon a Petition for Rehearing
filed by the appellant.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the appellant's petition for
rehearing is denied.
Dated this 16th day of August, 1988.
FOR THE COURT:

lary T./Ndonan
ClerkNm:' t h e Court

UTAH RETIREMENT SYSTEMS

UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD
540 East 200 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84102
(801)355-3884
BERT D. HUNSAKER
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

February 16, 1987

Mr. Glen J. Ellis
P. 0, Box 1097
Provo, Utah 84603
REGISTERED MAIL

Dear Mr. Ellis:
This letter is written confirmation of the action taken by the Utah
State Retirement Board regarding your appeal of the administrative
denial of your disability retirement application.
The Board voted to deny your request, based on advice of legal
counsel and the interpretation of section 49-9a-a, enacted in 1983 by
the Utah Legislature, which it feels specifically negates the disability
provisions of section 49-10, U.C.A., as amended.
As was explained to you at the hearing, Provo City elected not to
participate in the disability program provided in 49-9a, and chose to
provide its own program. Disability coverage of Provo City under
any programs by the State terminated when Provo chose to exclude the
benefits of 49-9a from its employees and provide another disability
program. It would appear from these facts that the real issue here is
one with Provo City and not the Utah State Retirement Board.
If I may provide any further information I shall be happy to do so.
Yours sincerely,

Bert D. Hunsaker
Executive Director
BDH:whm
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